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Abstract—We propose a novel artificial noise (AN) injection
scheme for wireless systems over quasi-static fading channels, in
which a single-antenna transmitter sends confidential messages to
a half-duplex receiver in the presence of an eavesdropper. Differ-
ent from classical AN injection schemes, which rely on a multi-
antenna transmitter or external helpers, our proposed scheme
is applicable to the scenario where the legitimate transceivers
are very simple. We analyze the performance of the proposed
scheme and optimize the design of the transmission. Our results
highlight that perfect secrecy is always achievable by properly
designing the AN injection scheme.
Index Terms—Physical layer security, artificial noise, secrecy
outage probability.
I. INTRODUCTION
The ubiquity of wireless devices in modern life has led to
an unprecedented amount of private and sensitive data being
transmitted over wireless channels. Consequently, security
issues of wireless transmissions have become critical due to
the unalterable open nature of the wireless medium. As a
complement to traditional cryptographic techniques based on
encryption, physical layer security (PLS) has been widely stud-
ied for ensuring secure wireless communications by exploiting
the characteristics of wireless channels [1]–[3].
Secure transmission with artificial noise (AN) injection
to confuse eavesdroppers is a key technique for PLS, and
has been widely studied in the literature. The classical AN
injection schemes were investigated in, e.g., [4]–[8]. For the
scenario where the transmitter has multiple antennas, AN is
designed to lie in the nullspace of the receiver’s channel
to degrade the eavesdropper’s channel, while in the single-
antenna scenario, external relays or helpers are adopted to
collaboratively generate AN. In [9], an AN injection scheme
was proposed for the scenario where the idealized full-duplex
receiver is available. The receiver broadcasts AN and receives
messages from the transmitter simultaneously. Although a
multi-antenna transmitter and external helpers are not needed,
however, the scheme in [9] requires the advanced full-duplex
receiver with very good self-interference cancelation.
Different from the aforementioned scenarios for AN in-
jection schemes, practical wireless systems often consist of
simple legitimate transceivers. A basic system operation is
that a single-antenna transmitter wants to send confidential
messages to a half-duplex receiver without any helpers. The
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simplicity of the legitimate transmitter-receiver pair indeed
makes it challenging to inject AN into such a single-antenna
system. For transmission over multi-path fading channels, AN
injection schemes for single-antenna systems were studied
in [10]–[12] by exploiting the degrees of freedom from the
cyclic prefix. However, these schemes rely on not only the
multi-path diversity, but also the idealized assumption that
keys or channel state information (CSI) can be secretly shared
between the transmitter and the receiver. To the best of our
knowledge, how to effectively inject AN into a basic single-
antenna system (over flat fading channels) has still not been
addressed in the literature.
In this paper, we propose a novel AN injection scheme
for single-antenna systems with a half-duplex receiver and no
helpers, which addresses the challenging problem of injecting
AN in single-antenna systems. Our proposed scheme does not
rely on multi-path diversity or the idealized assumption that
keys or CSI are secretly shared. We highlight that perfect
secrecy can always be achieved by properly designing the
proposed scheme. Note that existing PLS techniques cannot
ensure perfect secrecy of transmissions over quasi-static fading
channels when the instantaneous CSI of eavesdroppers is
unknown. Our results show that the proposed AN injection
scheme significantly improves the performance of the single-
antenna wiretap system.
Throughout the paper, we adopt the following notations:
E{·} denotes the expectation operation, P{·} denotes the prob-
ability measure, CN (µ, σ2) denotes the circularly symmetric
complex Gaussian distribution with mean µ and variance σ2.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
We consider a wiretap system over quasi-static Rayleigh
fading channels. As illustrated in Figure 1, a transmitter, Alice,
wants to send confidential messages to a half-duplex receiver,
Bob, in the presence of an eavesdropper, Eve. Alice, Bob, and
Eve each have a single antenna.1 Note that the consideration
of a single-antenna eavesdropper has been widely adopted in
the literature, e.g., [10], [13]–[17].
A. Channel Model
We adopt a block fading model where the channel gains
remain constant over a block of symbols and change in-
dependently from one block to the next. The instantaneous
channel gain from i to j (i, j ∈ {a, b, e}) is denoted as
hij ∼ CN
(
0,E
{|hij |2}), where the subscripts a, b and e
represent Alice, Bob, and Eve, respectively, and we denote
1Although we focus on a single-antenna system in this paper, the proposed
AN injection scheme is also applicable to multi-antenna systems where Alice,
Bob, and/or Eve have multiple antennas.
2Fig. 1: A wiretap system.
the power gain of the channel from i to j as gij = |hij |2. The
probability density function (PDF) of gij is given by
fgij (gij) =
1
g¯ij
exp
(
−gij
g¯ij
)
, (1)
where g¯ij = E {gij} denotes the average power gain of the
channel from i to j. We assume that the channel between
the transmitter and the receiver is reciprocal, i.e., hij = hji,
and hab, hae, and hbe are independent of each other. At the
start of each block, Alice transmits pilot symbols to enable
channel estimation at the receiver. We assume that Bob can
perfectly estimate the channel to Alice, and hence, Bob knows
the instantaneous CSI hab = hba. We further assume that the
duration of a block is sufficiently long and the time spent on
training is negligible.
B. Secure Encoding
We assume that Alice uses the widely adopted wiretap code
for data transmissions. There are two rate parameters, namely,
the codeword transmission rate, Rb, and the confidential
information rate, Rs. The positive rate difference Rb − Rs
is the cost required to provide secrecy against the eavesdrop-
per. A length n wiretap code is constructed by generating
2nRb codewords xn(w, v), where w = 1, 2, · · · , 2nRs and
v = 1, 2, · · · , 2n(Rb−Rs). For each message index w, we
randomly select v from
{
1, 2, · · · , 2n(Rb−Rs)} with uniform
probability and transmit the codeword xn(w, v). In addition,
we consider fixed-rate transmission, where the encoding rates
Rb and Rs are fixed over time.
III. NEW ARTIFICIAL NOISE INJECTION SCHEME
We propose a novel AN injection scheme to defend against
eavesdropping attacks in single-antenna systems. The two-
phase scheme is detailed as follows.
A. Phase 1
In the first phase, Bob broadcasts pseudo random AN. The
received signal at Alice or Eve in Phase 1 is given by
yi,1 =
√
Pbhbiz + ni, i ∈ {a, e}, (2)
where the subscripts a and e denote the parameters for Alice
and Eve, respectively, z ∼ CN (0, 1) denotes the normalized
complex Gaussian AN from Bob, Pb denotes the average
transmit power at Bob, and ni ∼ CN (0, σ2i ) denotes the
additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) at Alice or Eve.
During Phase 1, Bob does not send any pilot symbols for
the channel estimation. Thus, Alice and Eve do not know the
instantaneous CSI, i.e., hbi, and cannot decode z.
B. Phase 2
In the second phase, Alice forwards the received signal ya,1
from Phase 1 along with the information-bearing signal to
Bob. We denote the normalized transmitted signal at Alice in
Phase 2 as xa with E
{|xa|2} = 1, which is given by
xa =
√
αs+
√
1− α ya,1|ya,1| , (3)
where s denotes the normalized information-bearing signal,
with E
{|s|2} = 1, and 0 < α ≤ 1 denotes the power
allocation parameter between the information-bearing signal
and the AN. The received signal at Bob or Eve in Phase 2 is
given by
yi,2 =
√
Pahaixa + ni =
√
αPahais
+
√
(1− α)Pahai√
Pbgba + σ2a
(√
Pbhbaz + na
)
+ ni, i ∈ {b, e}, (4)
where the subscripts b and e denote the parameters for Bob
and Eve, respectively, Pa denotes the average transmit power
at Alice, and nb ∼ CN (0, σ2b ) denotes the AWGN at Bob.
From (4), we note that Bob needs to know Pa, Pb, α, σ
2
a, hab =
hba, gba = |hba|2, and z to cancel the received AN. As men-
tioned before, Bob knows the instantaneous CSI hab = hba
and gba = |hba|2. He also knows z, which is generated by
himself in Phase 1, and his average transmit power Pb. We
further assume that Alice has publicly shared the (fixed) values
of Pa, α, and σ
2
a to Bob before the transmission. Thus, Bob
can successfully cancel the received AN. Then, the received
signal-to-noise ratios (SNRs) at Bob and Eve are, respectively,
given by
γb =
αPagab
(1−α)Pagab
Pbgba+σ2a
σ2a + σ
2
b
(5)
γe =
αPagae
(1− α)Pagae + σ2e
. (6)
It is worth pointing out that (6) is based on the assumption
that Eve has a single antenna. If Eve has multiple antennas,
she can take advantage of the receiver diversity to improve the
received SNR, while her received SNR is still degraded by the
injected AN.
IV. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS AND OPTIMAL POWER
ALLOCATION
A. Performance Analysis
We first derive the PDFs of the received SNRs, and then
characterize the security, reliability, and throughput perfor-
mances of the system.
1) PDF of Received SNR:
We rewrite (5) and (6) as γb = Φ(gab) and γe = Ψ(gae),
respectively. We note that Φ(gab) and Ψ(gae) are differentiable
and monotonic for gab > 0 and gae > 0, respectively. Thus,
γb = Φ(gab) and γe = Ψ(gae) can be uniquely solved for gab
3and gae to give gab = Φ
−1(γb) and gae = Ψ
−1(γe), respec-
tively. We then obtain the PDFs of γb and γe, respectively, as
fγb(γb) = fgab
(
Φ−1 (γb)
) ∂Φ−1 (γb)
∂γb
=
1
2αg¯abPaPb
(
ω3√
ω21+4αω2γb
+(1−α)Paσ2a+Pbσ2b
)
× exp
(
−ω1 +
√
ω21 + 4αω2γb
2αg¯abPaPb
)
(7)
fγe(γe) = fgae
(
Ψ−1 (γe)
) ∂Φ−1 (γe)
∂γe
=
ασ2e
Pag¯ae (α−(1−α)γe)2
exp
(
− γeσ
2
e
g¯ae (Pa (α−(1−α)γe))
)
,
(8)
where ω1 = ((1− α)γb − α)Paσ2a + Pbγbσ2b , ω2 =
PaPbσ
2
aσ
2
b , and ω3 = (α+ 2(1− α)γb)ω2 + (1 −
α) ((1− α)γb − α)Paσ4a + P 2b γbσ4b .
2) Security, Reliability, and Throughput Performances:
The security performance is measured by the secrecy outage
probability, which is defined by [13]
pso = P (Ce > Rb −Rs) , (9)
where Ce = log2 (1 + γe) denotes Eve’s instantaneous chan-
nel capacity. From (8), we have
pso =
{
0 , if α ≤ 1− 2Rs−Rb ,
exp
(
− (2Rb−2Rs )σ2e
(2Rs+(α−1)2Rb )g¯aePa
)
, otherwise.
(10)
The reliability performance of the system is measured by
the connection outage probability, which is defined by
pco = P (Rb > Cb) , (11)
where Cb = log2 (1 + γb) denotes Bob’s instantaneous chan-
nel capacity. From (7), we have
pco = P
(
γb < 2
Rb − 1) = ∫ 2Rb−1
0
fγb(γb) dγb. (12)
The closed-form expression for pco is intractable due to the
complicated expression for fγb(γb) in (7).
The throughput of the system is given by
η =
1
2
(1−pco)Rs = 1
2
(
1−
∫ 2Rb−1
0
fγb(γb) dγb
)
Rs, (13)
where the scalar factor 1/2 is due to the fact that two time
units are required in two phases.
Remark 1: From (10), we highlight that perfect secrecy, i.e.,
pso = 0, can be achieved with the proposed AN injection
scheme for any Rb > Rs > 0 by setting the power allocation
parameter as
α ≤ 1− 2Rs−Rb . (14)
Note that existing PLS techniques cannot ensure perfect se-
crecy of transmissions over quasi-static fading channels; see,
e.g., [4] and [13]–[15].
B. Optimal Power Allocation
In the following, we derive the optimal power allocation pa-
rameter that maximizes the throughput subject to the security
and reliability constraints. We assume that the encoding rates
have already been designed. The problem is formulated as
max
α
η (α) (15a)
s.t. pso ≤ ǫ, pco ≤ δ, 0 < α ≤ 1, (15b)
where ǫ ∈ [0, 1] and δ ∈ [0, 1] denote the maximum allowed
secrecy outage probability and the maximum allowed connec-
tion outage probability, respectively. We note that η mono-
tonically increases as α decreases. Thus, the optimal power
allocation parameter is obtained by finding the maximum α
that satisfies all the constraints in (15b), which is given by
αo = min
{(
1− 2Rs−Rb)(1− σ2e
Pag¯ae ln ǫ
)
, 1
}
. (16)
V. JOINT RATE AND POWER ALLOCATION DESIGN IN
ASYMPTOTIC SCENARIO
In this section, we allow more degrees of freedom, such that
Rb and Rs can be optimally chosen, and investigate the joint
rate and power allocation design.
A. Problem Formulation
The design problem is formulated as
max
α,Rb,Rs
η (α,Rb, Rs) (17a)
s.t. pso ≤ ǫ, pco ≤ δ, Rb ≥ Rs > 0, 0 < α ≤ 1. (17b)
For any given Rb and Rs, the optimal α is still given by (16).
We find that the closed-form solutions of the optimal Rb
and Rs are mathematically intractable due to the complicated
expression for the PDF of the received SNR at Bob, i.e., (7).
The optimal Rb and Rs for the design problem can be obtained
only by numerically solving max
Rb,Rs
η (α = αo, Rb, Rs) subject
to the constraints in (17b). In the following subsections, we
study an asymptotic scenario where σ2a → 0, in which the
closed-form solutions of Rb and Rs are tractable.
B. Asymptotic Analysis
We now resort to the asymptotic analysis of the scenario of
σ2a → 0. This condition can be validated when Alice has a very
sensitive receiver compared with Bob, such that σ2a ≪ σ2b . In
such a scenario, the noise power at Bob is determined by σ2b
only, and the received SNR at Bob is rewritten as
γb = αPagab/σ
2
b . (18)
Then, the PDF of γb becomes
fγb(γb) =
σ2b
αPag¯ab
exp
(
− σ
2
bγb
αPag¯ab
)
, (19)
the connection outage probability becomes
pco = P
(
γb < 2
Rb − 1) = 1−exp
(
−σ
2
b
(
2Rb − 1)
αPag¯ab
)
, (20)
4and the throughput of the system becomes
η =
1
2
(1− pco)Rs = 1
2
exp
(
−σ
2
b
(
2Rb − 1)
αPag¯ab
)
Rs. (21)
The expressions for γe, fγe(γe), and pso are kept unchanged
as (6), (8), and (10), respectively.
C. Feasible Constraint
We first determine the feasible constraints subject to which
a non-zero throughput is achievable. The feasible range of ǫ
and δ in the asymptotic scenario where σ2a → 0 is summarized
in the following proposition.
Proposition 1: The feasible range of the security and reli-
ability constraints is given by
{(ǫ, δ) : 0 ≤ ǫ ≤ 1, δl(ǫ) < δ ≤ 1} , (22)
where
δl(ǫ) = 1− exp

− σ2b
Pag¯ab
(
1− σ2e
Pa g¯ae ln ǫ
)

 . (23)
Proof: See Appendix A.
D. Design Solution
The closed-form solutions of the optimal α, Rb, and Rs to
the design problem in the asymptotic scenario where σ2a → 0
are summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 2: The optimal α, Rb, and Rs that maximize
the throughput subject to the security and reliability constraints
are given by
α∗ =
(
1− 2R∗s−R∗b
)(
1− σ
2
e
Pag¯ae ln ǫ
)
, (24)
R∗b = min
{
log2 (φ1) , log2
(
2ψ +
√
4ψ − 2ψ
)}
, (25)
R∗s = min {log2(φ2), ψ} , (26)
where
φ1 =
σ2b g¯ae ln ǫ+ g¯ab ln (1− δ)
(
σ2e − Pag¯ae ln ǫ
)
2σ2b g¯ae ln ǫ
, (27)
φ2 = −
(
σ2b g¯ae ln ǫ+g¯ab ln (1−δ)
(
σ2e − Pag¯ae ln ǫ
))2
4σ2b g¯abg¯ae ln (1− δ) ln ǫ (Pag¯ae ln ǫ− σ2e)
, (28)
and ψ is the solution of x to
√
4x − 2x
x2x
(
2x+1+2
√
4x − 2x−1) = σ
2
b g¯ae ln2 ln ǫ
g¯ab (Pag¯ae ln ǫ − σ2e)
. (29)
Proof: See Appendix B.
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VI. NUMERICAL RESULTS
We first show the reliability and security performances
of the proposed AN injection scheme with different power
allocations. Figure 2 plots the connection outage probability,
pco, and the secrecy outage probability, pso, versus the power
allocation parameter, α. The encoding rates are fixed at Rb=2
and Rs = 1. As depicted in the figure, pco decreases as α
increases, while pso increases as α increases. This observation
indicates that there exists a tradeoff between the reliability
and security performances. Allocating more power to the
information-bearing signal and less power to the AN improves
the reliability performance but worsens the security perfor-
mance. Additionally, we find that pso=0 when α≤0.5 in the
figure, which confirms that perfect secrecy is achievable by the
proposed AN injection scheme with enough power allocated
to the AN. Note that pso ≃ 1 when α = 1, which indicates that
the system is very insecure without the proposed AN injection
scheme.
We now compare the performances of our proposed AN in-
jection scheme and a benchmark scheme. We adopt the secure
on-off transmission scheme [13], [14], which is an existing
secure transmission scheme for single-antenna systems, as the
benchmark scheme. The comparison results are presented in
Figure 3, which plots the throughput, η, versus the security
constraint, ǫ. The performance achieved by the proposed AN
injection scheme is shown in Figure 3(a), and the performance
achieved by the benchmark scheme is shown in Figure 3(b).
We note that our proposed scheme always significantly out-
performs the benchmark scheme. In particular, the case of
σ2e = 0 represents the scenario where Eve has a very sensitive
5receiver, which implies the worst-case consideration (from the
legitimate users’ point of view) when σ2e is unknown, and
the secrecy constraint of ǫ = 0 indicates the requirement
of perfect secrecy. We highlight that non-zero throughput is
achievable by the proposed AN injection scheme even with
the worst-case consideration σ2e = 0 and the requirement of
perfect secrecy ǫ = 0. In contrast, non-zero throughput is not
achievable by the existing benchmark scheme with either the
worst-case consideration or the requirement of perfect secrecy.
VII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we have proposed a novel AN injection
scheme which is applicable to a single-antenna system with-
out any helpers. We have analyzed the scheme performance
and optimized the power allocation. Furthermore, we have
investigated the joint rate and power allocation design in
the asymptotic scenario where σ2a → 0. Our results show
that the proposed AN injection scheme effectively improves
the performance of the system, and even perfect secrecy
is achievable by allocating enough power to the AN. It is
worth mentioning that the application of the proposed AN
injection scheme is not limited to single-antenna systems,
and an interesting future research direction is to evaluate the
performance of the proposed scheme in multi-antenna systems.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1
The feasible security constraint is 0 ≤ ǫ ≤ 1 without the
consideration of the reliability constraint. The problem to find
the minimum achievable pco is formulated as
min
α,Rb,Rs
pco (30a)
s.t. pso ≤ ǫ, Rb > Rs > 0, 0 < α ≤ 1. (30b)
From (20), we find that pco is a decreasing function of α
for any given Rb. Then, for any given Rb and Rs, it is
wise to have the maximum α that satisfies pso ≤ ǫ and
0 < α ≤ 1, which is given in (16). For Rb and Rs satisfying(
1− 2Rs−Rb) (1− σ2e/ (g¯aePa ln ǫ)) ≤ 1, it is wise to choose
α = (1 − 2Rs−Rb)(1− σ
2
e
g¯aePa ln ǫ
). (31)
Substituting (31) into (20), we find that pco(Rb, Rs) is a
convex function with respect to (w.r.t.) Rb for any given Rs,
and it is wise to have
Rb = log2(2
Rs +
√
4Rs − 2Rs) (32)
to minimize pco. Substituting (31) and (32) into (20), we
find that pco(Rs) is a decreasing function of Rs. We
then find that the minimum achievable pco for Rb and
Rs that satisfy
(
1− 2Rs−Rb) (1− σ2e/ (g¯aePa ln ǫ)) ≤ 1
approaches (23) by calculating limRs→0 pco(Rs). Follow-
ing similar steps to those described above, we find that
the minimum achievable pco for Rb and Rs that satisfy(
1− 2Rs−Rb) (1− σ2e/ (g¯aePa ln ǫ)) > 1 is always larger
than (23). Thus, the minimum achievable pco approaches (23)
for Rb≥Rs>0. This completes the proof.
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2
For any given Rb and Rs, the optimal α
is given by (16). For Rb and Rs that satisfy(
1− 2Rs−Rb) (1− σ2e/ (g¯aePa ln ǫ)) ≤ 1, it is wise to
have α as (31). Substituting (31) into (21), we find that
η (Rb, Rs) is a concave function w.r.t. Rb for any given
Rs, and it is wise to have Rb as (32) to maximize η.
Then, substituting (31) and (32) into (21), we find that
η (Rs) is a concave function w.r.t. Rs for Rs > 0. With
the consideration of Rs ≤ Rb, we obtain the optimal
Rs as (26) and the corresponding optimal Rb as (25).
Following similar steps to those described above, we find
that the maximum achievable η for Rb and Rs that satisfy(
1− 2Rs−Rb) (1− σ2e/ (g¯aePa ln ǫ)) > 1 is always smaller
than the η achieved by having Rb and Rs as (25) and (26).
Thus, the solutions of the optimal α, Rb, and Rs are given as
(24), (25), and (26), respectively. This completes the proof.
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